The content on this page was last reviewed on 21 February 2019.

Recent cases alert
Alou v The Queen [2019] NSWCCA 231 — fact that terrorism offender radicalised at age 17 and committed offence at age 18 does not lead to conclusion that causal link between commission of offence and offender’s youth.
DPP (Cth) v Lou [2019] VCC 1399 — 19–20 year old offender’s immaturity accentuated by cultural dislocation having been isolated in Australia from relatively young age

1. Overview

Section 16A(2)(m) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) requires a court to take into account various factors personal to the offender including their age.

Section 16A
(2) In addition to any other matters, the court must take into account such of the following matters as are relevant and known to the court:
…
(m) the character, antecedents, age, means and physical or mental condition of the person

Section 20C of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) allows a court to utilise State or Territory sentencing provisions when dealing with young offenders.

Section 20C

A child or young person who, in a State or Territory, is charged with or convicted of an offence against a law of the Commonwealth may be tried, punished or otherwise dealt with as if the offence were an offence against a law of the State or Territory.

Regardless of whether s 20C applies, s 68(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) may pick up and apply state sentencing principles, including those that apply to offenders who committed an offence while they were under 18 years old but who were charged after they turned 18.¹

2. Offenders under the age of 18 years

Courts sentencing federal offenders who are or were under the age of 18 years must consider s 20C of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Section 20C allows a child or young person who commits a federal offence to be dealt with as if the offence were a State or Territory offence. A court does not have to operate under State or Territory law, as s 20C is permissive. A court may decide to sentence a child or young person charged with or convicted of a federal offence under Part IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).

2.1 Scope of s 20C

The effect of s 20C of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) is that sentencing options which are not otherwise picked up by Commonwealth provisions may be available to children and young persons who commit federal offences. For example, a Victorian court sentencing a federal offender who is a child or young person may set a youth supervision order pursuant to s 163 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1989 (Vic). All jurisdictions in Australia have enacted laws relating to young offenders that could be picked up by s 20C.²

Section 20C operates after a child or young person has been ‘charged with or convicted of’ a federal offence. Therefore, juvenile justice provisions which operate prior to an offender being charged are not picked up by the operation of s 20C.

Section 20C permits a child or young person to be ‘tried, punished or otherwise dealt with…’. Diversionary juvenile justice schemes could fall within the phrase ‘otherwise dealt with’ but the constitutional requirement that federal judicial power be exercised by a court may prohibit the use of some state and territory diversionary juvenile justice provisions for federal offenders.

2.2 Meaning of child and young person

The terms ‘child’ and ‘young person’ in s 20C of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) are not defined in Part IB of the Act.

The now repealed s 20C(2) referred to persons under the age of 18 years. This upper limit is consistent with the definitions of a ‘child’ provided in the procedural provisions within the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) for the purposes of Pt IAD (as a person under the age of 18) and for the purposes of Pt ID (as a person who is at least 10 years of age but under the age of 18): see Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 15YA and 23WA.

Section 20C allows state sentencing law to be picked up and applied as Commonwealth law.  Where the state law has a lower age, eg 17, an offender over this age would not get any benefit from s 20C irrespective of whether it would technically apply. Conversely, some state laws offer different sentencing options for offenders up to the age of 21. For example under the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), when s 20C applies, a court could order a sentence be served in juvenile detention until the offender turned 21.³

2.3 Exercise of Federal Judicial Power

Care should be taken to ensure that courts have the power to utilise particular State or Territory juvenile justice provisions.

Courts may not have the power to refer young offenders to diversionary juvenile justice schemes. These schemes may contravene constitutional principles as they may be seen as requiring a body other than a court to exercise federal judicial power.

In Newman v A (a child) (1992) 67 A Crim R 342, 348, the court held that s 20C does not empower a court to direct a young person to a non-judicial body. Murray J (White and Wallwork JJ agreeing) said:

It follows that when the Children’s Court was exercising its exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint of federal offences against the respondent, it was bound by the provisions of the Judiciary Act (Cth), s 39(2)(d) [now repealed], to exercise the jurisdiction itself. Having regard to the provisions to which I have referred above, the Children’s Court clearly had the power to do so and it had to proceed, in my opinion, upon the basis that although the provisions of the Child Welfare Act (WA) Pt V on their face authorised and required it to refer the complaint for determination by a children’s panel, it was not authorised by law to take that course and it should proceed upon the basis that Pt V did not apply to a child charged with various federal offences (emphasis added).

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3. Youthful Offenders over the age of 18

At common law, courts have placed significant emphasis on an offender’s youth. For example, in R v Mills [1998] VSC 241; 4 VR 235, 241, Batt JA (with whom Phillips CJ and Charles JA agreed) stated:

Youth of an offender, particularly a first offender, should be a primary consideration for a sentencing court when that matter properly arises.

All Australian jurisdictions place broadly similar emphasis on the youth of an offender.⁴

The treatment of youth as a mitigating factor at the Commonwealth level has been demonstrated in  R v Leask [2013] WASCA 243 and Stark v The Queen [2009] WASC 376.

In Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372, the Court reaffirmed the general principles in R v Mills [1998] VSC 241⁵ and noted that three main principles underlie the ‘general primacy of an offender’s youth as a sentencing consideration’.⁶

The three main principles, which relate to issues of maturity, prospects of rehabilitation, and the effects of incarceration in adult prison, were outlined by Redlich J in Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372, [34]–[36] (Coghlan and Macaulay JJA agreeing). These principles are that:

1. Young offenders being immature are therefore more prone to ill-considered or rash decisions, and may lack the degree of insight, judgment and self-control possessed by an adult. Further, they may not fully appreciate the nature, seriousness and consequences of their criminal conduct;⁷
2. Rehabilitation of young offenders is one of the great objectives of the criminal law, and courts recognise the potential for young offenders to be rehabilitated. This potential exists because young offenders are typically still in a stage of mental and emotional development and may be more open to influences designed to positively change their behaviour than adults. There is a community interest in the effective rehabilitation of young offenders, as the community will be protected from further offending.⁸
3. Courts sentencing young adults are cognisant that the effect of incarceration in an adult prison on a young offender would more likely impair, rather than improve, the offender’s prospects of successful rehabilitation, due to the potential for exposure to corrupting influences and the exacerbation of anti-social tendencies. The likely detrimental effect of adult prison on a youthful offender has adverse flow-on consequences for the community.⁹

 3.1 Youthful Offenders and Rehabilitation

Emphasis is placed on rehabilitation when sentencing youthful offenders.¹⁰

In Lahey v Sanderson [1959] Tas SR 17, 21, Bunbury CJ indicated that the reformation of a young offender is an important and potentially dominant sentencing consideration. Similarly, in R v Mills [1998] VSC 241, 4 VR 235, 241, Batt JA held that rehabilitation is usually more important than general deterrence in the case of a youthful offender.

See further Rehabilitation.

3.2 Youth may be deemed to carry diminished mitigatory weight

Courts have noted that there are cases in which factors such as youth and rehabilitation would take a ‘back seat’ to other sentencing considerations. This can occur where the offending is serious, where the offence is often committed by young offenders or where the offender’s immaturity did not play a part in the offending.

3.2.1 Seriousness of the offence

Where the degree of criminality of the offences requires the sentencing objectives of deterrence, denunciation, just punishment and protection of the community to become more prominent in the sentencing calculus, the weight to be attached to youth is correspondingly reduced.¹¹

This was acknowledged in Papachristodoulou v The Queen [2017] VSCA 284, where Kaye JA and T Forrest AJA stated at [37] that:

However, the weight to be given to the youth of an offender, as a mitigating circumstance, generally is reduced where the offence committed by the offender is serious, and particularly where the offence is of a kind commonly committed by offenders who are young and immature.

In the state sentencing case of DPP v Lawrence [2004] VSCA 154, Batt JA (Winneke P and Nettle JA agreeing) stated at [22] that:

[W]ith an offence as serious as intentionally causing serious injury and particularly with an instance of it as grave as this one, the offender’s youthfulness and rehabilitation, achieved and prospective, whilst not irrelevant in the instinctive synthesis which the sentencing judge must make, were of much less significance than they would have been with a less serious offence. As has been said, youth and rehabilitation must be subjugated to other considerations. They must, as the President said in Wright, take a “back seat” to specific and general deterrence where crimes of wanton and unprovoked viciousness (of which the present is an example) are involved, particularly where (again as here) the perpetrator has been given previous chances to control his aggressive habits. This is because the offending is of such a nature and so prevalent that general deterrence, specific deterrence and denunciation of the conduct must be emphasised.

The weight of youth as a mitigatory factor is particularly diminished where the youth has committed a terrorist offence or similar offences involving extreme violence.¹²

  In DPP (Cth) v MHK [2017] VSCA 157, the 17 year old offender pleaded guilty to doing acts in preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act. Warren CJ, Weinberg and Kaye JJA held at [56]–[57] and [65]–[66] that:

In the present case, the respondent was only 17 years of age at the time of the offending.  Ordinarily, and in general, the youth of an offender is an important mitigating circumstance.

On the other hand, it is recognised that those principles need to be appropriately moderated where, as in a case such as this, the offender has been involved in serious and dangerous offending.

…

Certainly, to some extent, his youth and immaturity at the time must be weighed in the balance in determining the level of his culpability.  However, he had the benefit of a good upbringing, and he had progressed well in his education, until he was diverted by his increasing devotion to the extremist propaganda of ISIS.

However, equally, he was not a child, in the ordinary sense of that word, at the time of his offending.  At the age of 17 years, he stood on the threshold of adulthood.  He was old enough to know that what he was doing was grossly wrong, to give some thought to the enormity of the actions that he was planning to carry out, and to resist the allure of the evil influence of Islamic State.

While youth is relevant in determining the weight to be given to general deterrence and denunciation in the sentencing equation, its weight is diminished, quite measurably, in cases such as this, in which a youthful offender either participates in, or plans to carry out, actions of extreme violence (emphasis added).¹³

Similarly, in R v Khaja (No 5) [2018] NSWSC 238 an 18 year old offender pleaded guilty to a terrorism planning offence. Fagan J stated at [69] that:

The offender was young and impressionable but at 18 years and 6 months he was old enough to know that he was planning something appallingly wrong. His youth is relevant to determining the level of his moral culpability for the purpose of fixing his sentence. Taking that factor into account, his culpability must still be assessed as very high (emphasis added).

This position was reiterated by Bellew J in R v Khalid [2017] NSWSC 1365, Bellew J stated at [114] that:

Khalid’s offending was obviously of the utmost seriousness. His act of agreeing with the other conspirators to commit acts in preparation for a terrorist act is properly regarded as adult-like behaviour. It involved considerable planning, and detailed discussions about the nature of a proposed act of terrorism and the possible targets upon which it might be perpetrated. The agreement also involved the acquisition of firearms and ammunition. Those circumstances highlight a need to protect society. They serve to reduce the significance of issues of rehabilitation. (emphasis added).

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3.2.2 Where offence prevalent among youths

In the state armed robberies case of Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372, it was noted that where a crime is prevalent among young offenders, that fact may require that deterrence receive particular emphasis, with a corresponding reduction in the emphasis to be given to a mitigating circumstance such as age.¹⁴

The Court stated at [41]–[42] that:

The Crown, relying upon the fact that the applicants’ offending was of a type more commonly committed by young persons initially submitted that this was an additional reason why deterrence must be given greater weight and the ‘youthfulness of an offender cannot be of much significance’ …

Where the prevalence of a crime amongst a particular group is established on proper material before the court, there may be circumstances in which that fact requires that deterrence receive particular emphasis, with a corresponding reduction in the emphasis to be given to a mitigating circumstance. The offences of culpable driving and white collar crime illustrate such an approach where the good character of the offender will not be given the same mitigatory effect because of the prevalence of that characteristic amongst those committing such offences.¹⁵

However, the court in Azzopardi, stated that only in circumstances of the gravest criminal offending and when there is no realistic prospect of rehabilitation may the mitigatory consideration of age be viewed as all but extinguished.¹⁶

3.2.3 Where immaturity does not play a part in offending

The emphasis given to rehabilitation rather than general deterrence and retribution may be reduced when a young person conducts themselves in the way that an older person might conduct themselves.¹⁷

This is because where a young person is conducting themselves as an adult they cannot rely on the immaturity of age in mitigating their sentence. In determining whether a young offender has engaged in ‘adult behaviour’ the court will look to various matters including the use of weapons, planning or pre-meditation, the existence of an extensive criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the offence.¹⁸

For example, in Hartman v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 261, the Court sentenced a 23 year old offender under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) for offences of insider trading and communicating inside information, contrary to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Court stated that it placed no weight on the offender’s youth or immaturity, noting at [93] that:

We do not agree, however, that, in the circumstances of this matter, the applicant’s youth and relative immaturity have any role to play in downgrading or lessening the importance of general deterrence. We recognise that in some cases these factors may be both relevant and important on the issue (MS2 and Ors v Regina [2005] NSWCCA 397; (2005) 158 A Crim R 93 per Simpson J at [9]; Adams J at [15]–[16]; BP v R [2010] NSWCCA 159; (2010) 201 A Crim R 379 per Hodgson JA at [3]–[6], but see, Johnson J at [74]–[75]; R v Hearne [2001] NSWCCA 37; (2001) 124 A Crim R 451 at 458; KT v R [2008] NSWCCA 51; (2008) 182 A Crim R 571 at 577–578). We do not consider in the present matter that they are relevant and important in that way. The applicant was operating in the adult sphere of business and commerce in every respect, and of course he was himself an educated and worldly young adult in every sense of the word. The Court cannot lose sight of the need to deter young adults from taking the significant financial advantages offered by the contemporary business world in circumstances where, at the same time, they reject the legal and moral constraints properly imposed upon their commercial behaviour (emphasis added).¹⁹

Similarly, where an offender’s immaturity did not play a role in their offending, age will carry less weight in mitigating the sentence imposed by a court. In Younan v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 248, Beazley P (R A Hulme J and R S Hulme JA agreeing) stated at [133]–[135] that:

In his remarks on sentence, his Honour, at [40], stated that the appellant was “not a young offender in the way that term is traditionally understood”, but nonetheless noted that his age was 22 or 23 at the time that the offences were committed.

Contrary to the appellant’s submission, his Honour did not err in his approach to the offender’s age. The focus in sentencing young offenders is on rehabilitation, in circumstances where, as stated in KT v R (2008) 182 A Crim R 571; [2008] NSWCCA 51, at [23], “the immaturity of the offender is a significant factor in the commission of the offence”. In those circumstances, it is accepted that “the criminality involved will be less than if the same offence was committed by an adult”
…

However, this was not a case where it could be or was suggested that the appellant’s immaturity was a significant factor in the appellant’s offending conduct. Indeed, there was no suggestion at all in the psychological evidence, the medical evidence or in the references tendered on his behalf on the sentence hearing that he was immature or otherwise acted immaturely. Rather, the focus of that evidence was on the appellant’s mental health. (citations omitted)

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3.3 Age required to be considered ‘youthful’

Courts sentencing federal offenders have been flexible in their approach to ‘youthful’ and have held that the mitigating effect of age may persist well beyond eighteen years of age. For example, in R v Evans [2013] NTCCA 9, the 26 year old offender was treated as a youthful offender with good prospects of rehabilitation.²⁰

Priest and Hansen JJA held in Huynh v The Queen; Au v The Queen [2017] VSCA 216 that the 27 year old drug trafficking offender was not ‘relatively youthful’ and a prior conviction for drug trafficking reduced any significance of youth.²¹

Their Honours stated at [51] that:

Although we recognise that there is no fixed point beyond which an offender can no longer be considered youthful, and acknowledging that there may be cases where an offender who is aged 23 or 24 years might still be considered relatively youthful, in our view it is a stretch to suggest that at the age of 28 years Au might attract the principles which inform the sentencing of youthful offenders. Youthful offenders often attract leniency because their immaturity may have deprived them of the insight and self-control possessed by an adult; and it is generally recognised that there is greater potential for youthful offenders to be rehabilitated, such potential rehabilitation likely being impeded by incarceration in an adult prison. For the purpose of determining whether an offender is ‘youthful’, the relevant date is the date of sentencing, and as the age of the offender increases, the force of the general proposition that rehabilitation should be the primary sentencing consideration for youthful offenders diminishes (emphasis added; citations omitted).

In R v Chhom Nor [2005] VSCA 46, the 32 year old offender argued that the sentencing judge had failed to give sufficient weight to his youth when sentencing for drug trafficking offences. In dismissing that ground of appeal, the court observed that it was ‘generous’ for the trial judge to have treated the offender as youthful.²²

In the drug importation case of R v Nguyen; R v Pham [2010] NSWCCA 238, [72] Johnson J (Hulme J and MacFarlan JA agreeing) stated that a 32 year old offender was not young, and therefore ‘the immaturity of youth cannot be claimed as a factor bearing upon their transgressions’.

4. Elderly Offenders

At common law, the fact that an offender is elderly may mitigate sentence.

In sentencing federal offenders courts have taken old age into account, but have emphasized it should not override the gravity of the offence and the need for deterrence.²³

In Ljuboja v The Queen [2011] WASCA 143, while sentencing under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the court reviewed the principles applicable to elderly offenders, stating at [102]–[103]:

Australian authorities have established that advanced age is a relevant consideration in determining whether a sentence will be crushing. The rationale is that each year of a sentence represents a substantial proportion of the period of life which is left to an offender of advanced age…

However, whether and, if so, to what extent leniency should be given to an offender of advanced age, depends on all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. As Steytler P noted in Guylas (Gulyas v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 263), the authorities emphasise that age is only one factor in the sentencing process, and that advanced age can never be a justification for a sentence which is not fairly proportionate to the offence or otherwise inappropriate. See also Hunter (103) (R v Hunter(1984) 36 SASR 101). An offence may be so serious that humanitarian considerations cannot be accommodated.

In Ljuboja, the court dismissed an appeal against a 25 year term imprisonment with a minimum of 16 years for serious drug charges, where at the time of sentencing the offender was 60 years old. The court stated at [116]–[117]:

The imposition of condign punishment was justified and necessary. As the sentencing judge noted, the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation were poor. The most significant mitigatory factors were his age and his pleas of guilty. However, the extent of any leniency that could be extended to the appellant on account of his age was limited by the very serious nature of his offending.

In Mokbel v The Queen [2013] VSCA 118, the Court dismissed an appeal against a 30 year federal sentence imposed on a 46 year old for serious drug trafficking offences. The offender was also suffering from ill-health.²⁴

In considering the argument that such a sentence was manifestly excessive or ‘crushing’²⁵ the court cited the principles listed in the state sentencing case of R v R L P [2009] VSCA 271, stating at [114]–[115] that:

[T]he age of an offender is always a relevant consideration and may, in particular cases, be of considerable significance. But it will never be determinative: DPP v Kien [2000] VSC 376.

In R v R L P (2009) 213 A Crim R 461 this Court was considering the case of an offender who was 77 when sentenced. The Court summarised the applicable propositions as follows:

We approach the conjunction of the appellant’s advanced years and ill health with these propositions in mind.

1. The age and health of an offender are relevant to the exercise of the sentencing discretion.
2. Old age or ill health are not determinative of the quantum of sentence.
3. Depending upon the circumstances, it may be appropriate to impose a minimum term which will have the effect that the offender may well spend the whole of his remaining life in custody.
4. It is a weighty consideration that the offender is likely to spend the whole or a very substantial portion of the remainder of their life in custody.
5. Other sentencing considerations may be required to surrender some ground to the need to exercise compassion to take account of the real prospect that the offender may not live to be released and that the offender’s ill health will make his or her period of incarceration particularly onerous.
6. Just punishment, proportionality and general and specific deterrence remain primary sentencing considerations in the sentencing disposition notwithstanding the age and ill health of the offender.
7. Old age and ill health do not justify the imposition of an unacceptably inappropriate sentence: R v R L P(2009) 213 A Crim R 461, 476 [39].

In the insider trading case R v Hall (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 890, and the materially misleading case of R v Loiterton [2005] NSWSC 905, emphasis was placed on the old age of offenders convicted of offences under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In both instances the judge recognised that the defendants, aged in their 60s, had high prospects of rehabilitation and did not require specific deterrence.²⁶

However, in R v Knight [2004] NSWCCA 145, [33] Howie J (Grove and Simpson JJ agreeing) emphasized that advanced age and ill health cannot, generally speaking provide an excuse for the commission of criminal activity and does not necessarily warrant leniency. The offender in Knight had committed offences including defrauding the Commonwealth and dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity. The Court stated at [33] that:

In a case such as this where the applicant has a record for serious fraudulent conduct over a lengthy period of time and these present offences continued unabated until his arrest, these subjective considerations can be given little, if any, weight.

4.1 Courts’ consideration of  ‘advanced age’

In R v Sellars [2010] NSWCCA 133, at [16] the Court noted that 51 years of age was not ‘an age where his advancing years were of any particular significance’.

Conversely, in Mokbel v The Queen [2013] VSCA 118, the age of the 46 year old offender was considered relevant, where the offender was also suffering from ill-health. The offender had heart disease, and it was evidenced that as a result, he had a life expectancy of 24 years, 11 years less than a person without the health condition.²⁷

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1. See, eg, R v Lovi [2012] QCA 24, [15]–[21] (Muir JA, Chief Justice and Atkinson J agreeing).[↩]
2. See, eg, Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) Ch 8A; R v NF (No 1) [2016] ACTSC 216, [112] (Refshauge J); Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) see R v Lovi [2012] QCA 24, [15]–[21] (Muir JA, Chief Justice and Atkinson J agreeing); Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA); Youth Justice Act 2005 (NT); Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA); Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas).[↩]
3. [3] Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 19.[↩]
4. See, eg, Mamarika v Murphy and Anor [2007] NTSC 58, [80] (Olsson AJ); Ugle v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 104,  [71] (Buss JA, Pullin JA agreeing), R v McGaffin [2010] SASCFC 22, [69] (White J), R v Hearne [2001] NSWCCA 37, [22]–[25] (Powell JA, Hulme and Dowd JJ); R v Kuzmanovski; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2012] QCA 19, [16] (Fraser JA, Muir and Chesterman JJA agreeing); Garcie v Lusted [2014] TASSC 27,[10]–[13], (Pearce J).[↩]
5. See also R v Curtis [2013] ACTSC 291.[↩]
6. Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372,[34] (Redlich JA, Coghlan and Macaulay JJA agreeing).[↩]
7. Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372,[34] (Redlich JA, Coghlan and Macaulay JJA agreeing).[↩]
8. Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372,[35] (Redlich JA, Coghlan and Macaulay JJA agreeing).[↩]
9. Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372,[36] (Redlich JA, Coghlan and Macaulay JJA agreeing).[↩]
10. See, eg, R v Evans [2013] NTCCA 9,[44] for emphasis on rehabilitation in the federal context.[↩]
11. Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372,[44] (Redlich JA, Coghlan and Macaulay JJA); IE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 70, [16] (Latham J, Spigelman CJ and Hulme J agreeing). See also R v Hearne [2001] NSWCCA 37, [24] where the Court noted: ‘… in none of the cases is it suggested that the weight to be given to the element of youth varies depending on the seriousness of the offence… Of course that is not to say that other factors such as deterrence or retribution may not have a relatively greater part to play in the more serious offences than they do in less serious ones.’ See further R v Mules [2007] QCA 47, [21] where McCurdo P noted: ‘This Court’s decision in R v Horne [2004] QCA 13, a case to which her Honour unfortunately was not referred, makes clear that youthful offenders with limited criminal histories and promising prospects of rehabilitation who have pleaded guilty and cooperated with the administration of justice, even where they have committed serious offences like these, should receive more leniency from courts than would otherwise be appropriate.’[↩]
12. R v Alou (No 4) [2018] NSWSC 221, [170]. See also Elomar v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 303, [820].[↩]
13. This position was also applied in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Besim [2017] VSCA 158, [116].[↩]
14. Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372,[42] (Redlich JA, Coghlan and Macaulay JJA). However, the Court found at[43] that there was ‘no evidence to establish that such crimes are more prevalent amongst young offenders and … it should not be assumed that crimes of violence in public places are predominantly committed by youthful offenders, or that youthful offenders as an age group will represent a high proportion of those who commit acts of violence in such places.’[↩]
15. See also Papachristodoulou v The Queen [2017] VSCA 284, [37].[↩]
16. Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372,[44] (Redlich JA, Coghlan and Macaulay JJA).[↩]
17. KT v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 51, [25] (McClellan CJ at CL); R v Adamson [2002] NSWCCA 349, [32]–[34] (Beazley JA, Bell J agreeing); R v Voss [2003] NSWCCA 182, [16] (Grove J, Whealy and Shaw JJ agreeing). KT v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 51 was cited in the Commonwealth case of Hartman v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 261, [93].[↩]
18. KT v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 51, [25] (McClellan CJ at CL); Ugle v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 104, [71]–[72] (Buss JA, Pullin and Mazza JJA agreeing). See also R v HG [2018] NSWSC 1849, [93].[↩]
19. See also R v Curtis (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 866, [32].[↩]
20. R v Evans [2013] NTCCA 9,[44]. See also R v Leask [2013] WASCA 243.[↩]
21. Huynh v The Queen; Au v The Queen [2017] VSCA 216, [52].[↩]
22. R v Chhom Nor [2005] VSCA 46,[29] (Chernov JA, Winneke P and Cummins AJA agreeing).[↩]
23. R v Gordon [2012] QCA 334, [40] (White JA, Gotterson and Holmes JJA agreeing), citing R v Finlay [2007] QCA 400.[↩]
24. See also Physical Condition.[↩]
25. See also Totality Principle.[↩]
26. R v Hall (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 890, [118]; R v Loiterton [2005] NSWSC 905, [188].[↩]
27. Mokbel v The Queen [2013] VSCA 118,[111].[↩]