General Sentencing Principles
- Multiple or Continuing Offences
- Double Punishment
- Part IB: Sentencing of Federal Offenders
- Taking into Account Other Offences
- Victim of the Offence
- One Transaction Rule
- Section 16A
- Sentencing Factors
- Totality Principle
- Nature and Circumstances of the Offence
- Physical Condition
- Injury, Loss or Damage
- Consistency in Federal Sentencing
- Mental Condition
- The Impact of COVID-19 on Federal Sentencing
- Offender’s Family and Dependants
- Failure to Comply with Order or Obligation
- Course of Conduct
- Hardship to the Offender
- Contrition and Reparation
- Cultural Background
- Guilty Plea
- Adequacy of Punishment
Sentencing Options and Procedures
- Additional Sentencing Alternatives
- Breach of Conditional Release Bonds After Conviction
- Commencement of Federal Sentences
- Cumulative and Concurrent Sentences
- Conditional Release Orders After Conviction
- Hospital Orders
- Custodial Sentence
- Summary Disposition for Mental Illness
- Non Parole Period and Recognizance Release Orders
- Release on Parole or Licence
- Pre-Release Schemes and Leave of Absence
- Program Probation Orders
- Psychiatric Probation Orders
- Options without Proceeding to Conviction
- Table of Options
- Victim Impact Statements
- Sentencing Methodology
- Particular Sentencing Circumstances
- Ancillary Orders
The content on this page was last reviewed on 03 February 2015.
Recent cases alert
Tran v The Queen  VSCA 346 — resorting to a minute examination of individual circumstances of offending and offenders in attempting to demonstrate sentence not reasonably open is counter to concept of instinctive synthesis.
Jaafar v The Queen  NSWCCA 223 — sentencing judge in error by engaging in ‘two-tier’ sentencing rather than instinctive synthesis approach, contrary to principles in Markarian v The Queen  HCA 25.
*Guidance from these cases has not yet been incorporated into the commentary
A sentencing judge must balance many different and conflicting factors to reach a sentence that is just in all of the circumstances of each individual case. Underlying this method is the principle of individualised justice (described below).
In Australia a sentencing judge must employ an ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach to sentencing. The High Court has repeatedly endorsed the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing and has rejected other approaches, such as the ‘two-stage’ approach to sentencing.
2. Instinctive synthesis
The High Court has affirmed that the ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach is the appropriate method for determining a suitable sentence.1
In Markarian v The Queen  HCA 25 McHugh J described this approach at  as:
…the method of sentencing by which the judge identifies all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discusses their significance and then makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case. Only at the end of the process does the judge determine the sentence.
The plurality stated at :
Sentencing an offender is not, and cannot be undertaken as, some exercise in addition or subtraction. A sentencing judge must reach a single sentence for each offence and must do so by balancing many different and conflicting features. The sentencing cannot, and should not, be broken down into some set of component parts. As the plurality said in Wong v The Queen, “[s]o long as a sentencing judge must, or may, take account of all of the circumstances of the offence and the offender, to single out some of those considerations and attribute specific numerical or proportionate value to some features, distorts the already difficult balancing exercise which the judge must perform”
3. Individualised justice
The Australian Law Reform Commission has described the principle of individualised justice as requiring ‘the court to impose a sentence that is just and appropriate in all the circumstances of the particular case’.3
Professor Freiberg has noted that current Australian practice heavily favours individualism over consistency.5
The High Court recently reaffirmed the importance of individualized justice in Elias v The Queen; Issa v The Queen  HCA 31. French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ stated at :
As this Court has explained on more than one occasion, the factors bearing on the determination of sentence will frequently pull in different directions. It is the duty of the judge to balance often incommensurable factors and to arrive at a sentence that is just in all of the circumstances. The administration of the criminal law involves individualised justice, the attainment of which is acknowledged to involve the exercise of a wide sentencing discretion (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).6
- Wong v The Queen  HCA 64,  (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Markarian v The Queen  HCA 25, - (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan J); Barbaro v The Queen  HCA 2, .
- Barbaro v The Queen  HCA 2,  (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Wong v The Queen  HCA 64,- (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), Markarian v The Queen  HCA 25,  (McHugh J).
- Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Report No 103 (2006) [5.21].
- Keynote Address, The Hon J J Spigelman AC, ‘Consistency and Sentencing’ (Sentencing Conference 2008, Canberra, 8 Feb 2008) 2-3.
- Sarah Krasnostein and Arie Freiberg, ‘Pursuing consistency in an individualistic sentencing framework: if you know where you’re going, how do you know when you’ve got there?’ (2013) 76(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 265.
- See also Bugmy v The Queen  HCA 37, ,  (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).